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Abstract
Low labor productivity and small scale are key features of agriculture in poor na-
tions. This paper assesses quantitatively the role of self selection and skill investment
of farmers in accounting for these observations. I construct a two-sector overlapping
generation model featuring individual heterogeneity in skill. Individuals self-select into
two occupations: farmers and workers. As a key ingredient, I allow skill growth in
response to optimal investment. The model is calibrated to reproduce the farm size
distribution and other macroeconomic statistics in the US. Quantitative results show
that low aggregate total factor productivity and suboptimal skill investment are the
main drivers of unproductive, small-scale agriculture in poor countries.
JEL Classification: O11, O13, O41
Keywords: Agricultural productivity, skill investment, farm size distribution, income
differences.
1 Introduction
Two features of the agricultural sector in poor nations are striking. The first one is its
low productivity. Output per worker measured in international dollar in countries from the
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bottom 5% of the world income distribution is 60 times lower, compared to that in the
top 5%. The vast inequality in agricultural productivity across countries is documented
in Caselli (2005) and Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008), and has simulated a large body of
research to provide feasible explanations. These explanations range from unmeasured home
production as in Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2004), barriers to intermediate inputs as in
Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008), low efficiency of workers as in Lagakos and Waugh (2010)
and high transportation cost as in Adamopoulos (2006) and Gollin and Rogerson (2010).
The second, and relatively less well-known, feature is the small scale of production. I
follow a long tradition in the literature and measure scale as the land size of a farm. To
demonstrate the enormous differences in scale of agricultural production across countries, I
present two figures. Figure 1 plots mean farm size against 1996 real income per worker in log
scale. Mean farm size clearly rises with income per worker - with a correlation of 0.53. An
average farm in the United States, for example, commands 180 hectares of land - 90 times
the size of an average farm in Uganda. Most of the differences in mean farm size remain
after controlling for the size of arable land and types of crops produced within a country.
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Figure 1: Cross Country Distribution of Mean Farm Size
The inequality in average farm size reflects the differences in the size distribution of
farms. Figure 2 plots the (average) farm size distribution in two representative groups of
countries.1 In the poorest five nations, 73% of the farms are smaller than 5 hectares. In
contrast, 50% of the farms in the richest five nations exceed 50 hectares in size.
1Rich countries: US, Canada, Australia, Norway, Switzerland. Poor countries: Uganda, Burkina Faso,
Ivory Coast, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.
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Figure 2: Size Distribution of Farms Across Income Levels
Farm level data from the US show that larger farms are remarkably more productive.
Using 2007 agriculture census data, I find that farms in the top scale bracket are at least 16
times more productive in terms of sales per worker, and 30 times more productive in terms of
value added per worker, compared to those in the bottom scale bracket.2 Productivity also
appears to increase monotonically with scale, as illustrated in Figure 3. Internationally, farm
level productivity data as detailed as the ones in the US are not systematically available,
especially for developing countries. In a study of 15 developing countries, Cornia (1985) found
that larger farms have higher value added per worker, but lower value added per hectare.3
To see the effect of scale on average productivity in agriculture, consider a counterfactual
experiment where all countries have the US farm level productivity, but produce at their own
scales. In Appendix B, I show that observed differences in farm size distribution alone can
generate a factor of 7 differences in output per worker, between the 90th percentile country
and 10th percentile country.
Two questions naturally arise: why are farms predominantly small in poor nations and
how producing at a small scale affects agricultural productivity in these economies. I develop
a model in which agriculture output is produced by idiosyncratic farmers facing a decreasing
2Substantial differences remain when productivity is measured residually. The Solow residual ranges from
3 to 5 times higher for farms in the top scale bracket. The results are also robust when earlier censuses (92,
97 and 02) are used.
3Similar findings are documented in Fan and Chan-Kang (2005) for a set of asian countries, and in
Byiringiroa and Reardon (1996) for Rwanda. There is a also large literature debating the relation between
farm size and land productivity. See Feder (1985) and reference therein.
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Figure 3: Productivity by Size of Farms, United States 2007
returns to scale technology. The productivity of farmers determines the scale of production as
well as the average productivity in agriculture. The model builds on Lucas (1978), extended
to allow for on-the-job skill investments.
Differences in average productivity of farmers arise from two distinct margins in the
model. The extensive margin operates through occupation choice, i.e., heterogeneous in-
dividuals self-select into farmers and workers. More able individuals will run farms and
produce agricultural output, and less able ones will supply labor for wage. Subsistence need,
however, dictates that even less able farmers will be producing in poor nations. As a result,
average productivity of farmers is low in these countries. This margin is similar to the one
stressed in Lagakos and Waugh (2010).
The intensive margin operates through on-the-job skill investment, which is the key ingre-
dient of this paper. By allocating time to skill investment, farmers improve their exogenously
drawn productivity over the life cycle. At the aggregate, such improvement acts like an in-
crease in total factor productivity in agriculture. However, farmers in poor economies invest
less in skill due to high financing cost - in the form of high interest rate, which adversely
impacts their equilibrium productivity. On the one hand, skill investment can be broadly
interpreted as a form of human capital accumulation. Focusing on the intensive margin
accords with recent development in the literature that emphasizes the role of human cap-
ital accumulation in understanding income differences.4 On the other hand, cross-section
data in the US reveals that on-the-job skill investment is a critical component of farmer’s
4See Manuelli and Seshadri (2005), Cordoba and Ripoll (2007), Erosa et al. (2010), among others.
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productivity. Table 4 records the time allocation between farm work and non-farm work by
operators aged 25 and above, whose primary occupation is farming. Table 5 documents the
life-cycle productivity profile of farm operators. The key observation is that young farmers
allocate substantial amount of time to non-production activities that improve their future
productivity by as much as a factor of 1.5. This suggests that skill investment might be
quantitatively important in determining productivity in agriculture.
I calibrate the model to the US. In particular, the model reproduces the size distribution
of farms and time allocations of farmers. Doing so provides reasonable identification of
the underlying skill distribution and imposes discipline on the behavior of on-the-job skill
investment. Given exogenous differences in aggregate total factor productivity and land
endowment - both inferred from data, the model predicts a 23-fold difference in agricultural
output per worker between the 80th percentile country and the 20th percentile country,
compared to a 25-fold difference in the data. Like in the data, the model also generates
much larger farms in high income countries. Mean farm size is 380 hectares in the 80th
percentile country, and only 16 hectares in the 20th percentile country. Quite surprisingly,
endogenously produced farm size distributions are remarkably close to the actual ones for a
large set of countries, which I view as support of the mechanism stressed in this paper. The
model also accords well with data in terms of sector labor share and relative price.
This paper is related to a large literature that studies cross country income differences,
e.g., Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Prescott (1998), Hall and Jones (1999).5 In stress-
ing the role of unmeasured skill, this paper is similar to Assuncao and Ghatakb (2003).
However, they mainly focus on the negative correlation between size and land productiv-
ity in an analytical framework. Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2009) also focus on farm size
heterogeneity across countries and use a version of Lucas (1978) to endogenously generate
a size distribution. Two key features separate this paper from theirs. Firstly, they do not
consider occupation choice, and instead focus on time allocation between agricultural and
nonagricultural production uniformly for all household members, despite their different skills.
Secondly, a key contribution of this paper is to explore quantitatively the role of on-the-job
skill investment in determining productivity of farmers. This aspect is absent in their paper.
Hence, I view this paper as complement to theirs.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I describe the economic
environment and define a competitive equilibrium. In section 3, I calibrate the model and
5For stressing the role of agriculture in understanding income differences within a development accounting
framework, see also Cordoba and Ripoll (2005), Chanda and Dalgaard (2008) and Vollrath (2009).
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present the quantitative results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
Each period a continuum of measure one individuals are born, and live for T periods. Indi-
viduals of the same cohort constitute a household, with all decisions made by a hypothetical
household head. When born, individuals within a household draw independently their skill
type, z ∈ ℜ+, from a known, time invariant distribution G(z). The instantaneous utility
function of a household is given by
U(ca, cn) = η · log(ca − a¯) + (1− η) · log(cn)
where (ca, cn) denote, respectively, agricultural consumption and nonagricultural consump-
tion at the household level. Preference parameter η controls the relative taste towards two
consumption goods, and a¯ is typically interpreted as subsistence consumption level. a¯ > 0
implies an income elasticity of agricultural consumption less than unity.
Each member is endowed with one unit of physical time. Households equally own the
stock of land L¯. There is no population growth or lifetime uncertainty. Total measure of
individuals at any point in time is T.
2.2 Technology and Household Decision
Everybody works in this economy and faces two occupations: farmer and worker. All workers,
regardless of skill type, earn the same wage rate. A farmer combines her skill (z), labor (ha)
and land (ℓ) to produce agricultural output according to
Ya = A · z
1−γ
(
hαa · ℓ
1−α
)γ
where A represents the efficiency level. There are competitive rental markets for labor and
land at prices w and q, and output are sold in competitive markets at price p. All prices are
expressed relative to the price of nonagricultural output. A farmer with skill z in production
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earns residual profit π(z) after factor payments.
π(z) = arg max
{ha,ℓ}
p · Ya − w · ha − q · ℓ
For later reference, denote ha(z), ℓ(z) the optimal demand of labor and land. It is straight-
forward to show that profit is linear in the skill input, i.e.,
π(z) = z · (1− γ) · (p · A)
1
1−γ
(
γ
(α
w
)α(1− α
q
)1−α) γ1−γ
Although the initial realization is drawn exogenously, skill can subsequently grow through
investment. Specifically, skill evolves over time according to the following law of motion
zt+1 = zt + zt · s
θ
t , st ∈ [0, 1]
Each period, the household head considers tow alternative uses of each member’s time:
market work or skill investment. If st fraction is allocated to skill improvement, then (1−st)
is supplied to market work. This skill technology assumes time as the sole input, and hence
abstracts from resources input. This is done for several reasons. First, it allows for closed-
form solutions and clearer expositions. Second, data on time allocations of farm operators
are available to discipline relevant parameters. Lastly, data on resources investment by farm
operators in skill accumulation are limited, if available at all.
When born, the household head chooses for each member an occupation, sequences of
skill investment, and sequences of consumption and saving to maximize discounted household
utility. For simplicity, I assume that occupation can not change over time. This assumption
is not restrictive because I focus on the steady state in the quantitative analysis. For the
same reason, I state the household maximization problem of an arbitrary cohort as follows
max
{cat,cnt,st}
:
T∑
t=1
βtU(cat, cnt)
s.t :
T∑
t=1
pcat + cnt
R1−t
≤ Y
where R denotes the return on savings, and Y denotes the maximized discounted income
of the household. The following lemmas establish results that characterize the stationary
equilibrium, where all prices are constant.
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Lemma 1 Workers don’t invest in skill improvement.
This follows naturally from the assumption that all workers earn the same wage rate w,
regardless of skill type. Thus it is not optimal for a worker to invest in skill accumulation.
Discounted lifetime income of a worker is simply Yw =
∑T
t=1w · R
1−t. In contrast, since
residual profit is strictly increasing in skill input, Inada conditions ensure skill investment
profitable for all farmers. The following lemma characterizes the optimal investment profile
of farmers.
Lemma 2 Optimal time investment is independent of initial skill type
The proof is given in Appendix. The lemma implies a common slope of skill profile for all
farmers, and the level is determined by the initial draw. It is convenient to define variable
xt as follows
xt =

1, t = 1xt−1 · (1 + sθt−1), t = 2, ..., T
{xt}
T
t=1 summarize the level of skill at time t relative to the initial draw. Clearly, {xt} is
independent of skill type. This allows a simple expression of lifetime discounted income of a
type z farmer
Yf(z) = π(z) ·
T∑
t=1
{xt · (1− st) · R
1−t}
Note that Yf(z) is linear and strictly increasing in skill type z. Recall that discounted lifetime
income of a worker (Yw) is independent of skill type z. This leads to Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 There exists a cut-off level of skill type, z¯, such that household members with skill
type z < z¯ become workers, and household members with skill type z ≥ z¯ become farmers.
The most able members will manage farms and utilize their skills. The less able members
will supply inelastically one unit of labor to the market, and forgo their endowed skills.
The marginal farmer, whose skill type is z¯, is indifferent between two occupations. The
maximized discounted income of a household is
Y = G(z¯) · Yw +
∫
z¯
Yf(z)dG(z) + q · L¯/T ·
T∑
t=1
R1−t
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2.3 Nonagricultural Firm’s Optimization
There is a representative firm that produces nonagricultural output with a linear technology
Yn = A · Hn. Two remarks are in order. First, efficiency parameter A augments both
agricultural and nonagricultural production, and hence represents economy-wide efficiency.
From now on, I shall refer to A as total factor productivity (TFP). Second, Hn denotes labor
hours and does not embed skills. The representative firm solves
max
{Hn}
A ·Hn − w ·Hn
2.4 Equilibrium
A stationary competitive equilibrium is a collection of prices (w, p, q, R), consumption and in-
vestment (cat, cnt, st)
T
t=1, factor demand ha(z), ℓ(z), Hn such that: (1) given prices, (cat, cnt, st)
T
t=1
solve household maximization problem; (2) given prices, ha(z), ℓ(z) solve farm manager’s
profit maximization, and Hn solve nonagricultural firm’s profit maximization; (3) prices are
competitive; (4) all markets clear.
To solve the model, I begin by solving for prices (p, q). Equation (1) below states the
indifference condition of the marginal manager. Equation (2) below states the land market
clearing condition.
π(z¯) ·
T∑
t=1
{xt · (1− st) ·R
1−t} =
T∑
t=1
{w ·R1−t} (1)
∫
z¯
ℓ(z)dG(z) ·
T∑
t=1
{xt · (1− st)} = L¯ (2)
Dividing (1) by (2) yields an expression for the rental price of land
q =
[ ∑T
t=1{xt · (1− st)}∑T
t=1{xt · (1− st) · R
1−t}
]
·

γ · (1− α) ·
(∑T
t=1{w · R
1−t}
)
(1− γ) · L¯

 ·
∫
z¯
zdG(z)
z¯
(3)
Substituting (3) into (1) yields the relative price of agricultural good
p =
[ ∑T
t=1{w · R
1−t}
z¯ · (1− γ) ·
∑T
t=1{xt · (1− st) · R
1−t}
]1−γ
·
(
γ
(α
w
)α(1− α
q
)1−α)−γ
·
1
A
(4)
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Note the relative price of agricultural good is strictly decreasing in TFP. To the extend that
poor countries also have lower TFP, this implies higher price of agricultural consumption
in low income countries. Solving for optimal consumption bundles and aggregating over
generations yields the aggregate demand of two consumption goods
Ca =
T∑
t=1
cat =
[
T∑
t=1
(βR)t−1
]
·
[
Y − p · a¯
∑T
t=1R
1−t∑T
t=1 β
t−1
]
·
η
p
+ T · a¯ (5)
Cn =
T∑
t=1
cnt =
[
T∑
t=1
(βR)t−1
]
·
[
Y − p · a¯
∑T
t=1R
1−t∑T
t=1 β
t−1
]
· (1− η) (6)
In each household, the measure of workers is G(z¯). Given constant prices, the division
of labor does not change across cohorts. Hence the total measure of worker in the economy
is simply T ·G(z¯). The measure of workers demanded in agricultural production is obtained
by first integrating over farmers within a household, and then summing over generations
Ha =
[
T∑
t=1
xt(1− st)
]
·
∫
z¯
ha(z)dG(z)
Similarly, aggregate agricultural output is given by
Ya =
[
T∑
t=1
xt(1− st)
]
·
∫
z¯
Ya(z)dG(z)
Imposing labor market clearing, the measure of workers in the nonagricultural sector is
Hn = T ·G(z¯)−Ha. The output in the nonagricultural sector is Yn = A ·Hn. Goods market
clearing conditions require Ca = Ya, Cn = Yn. Loan market clears by Walras’ law.
Finally nonagricultural firm’s optimization implies w = A. Hence the two goods market
clearing conditions constitute two equations with two unknowns (z¯, R) that can be solved
numerically. Once the cut-off skill and interest rates are known, rest of the equilibrium
variables can be recovered easily.
Lemma 4 Low TFP economy has a lower cut-off skill level, and a higher interest rate.
The proof is given in Appendix B. Lemma 4 suggests that low TFP adversely impacts
the productivity of farmers through both the extensive margin and the intensive margin. On
the one hand, low TFP implies that the marginal farmer is of lower quality. On the other
hand, higher interest rate in low TFP economy also reduces the incentive to invest in skill
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improvement because future income gets discounted more. As a result, the skill profile is
less steep. Both margins lead to lower average productivity of farmers, which translates into
low measured labor productivity and small scale.
3 Quantitative Analysis
3.1 Calibration
In this section, I parameterize the model. Model period is 10-years. Individuals are born
at the age of 25 and live for 5 periods. Some model parameters are either standard or can
be inferred without solving the model. Assuming an annual discount rate of 0.96, I set
β = 0.9610. TFP for the US is normalized to be 1. Elasticity parameters of the agricultural
production function are directly inferred from agriculture value added data in the US (see
Appendix A). Over the period 1980-1999, the average share of agricultural output accruing
to farm operators is 20%. I thus set γ = 1 − 0.2 = 0.8. This paper is certainly not the
first one to estimate the span-of-control parameter. However, existing works either focus on
the aggregate economy as in Guner, Ventura, and Yi (2008), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)
and Gollin (2008) or the manufacturing sector as in Atkeson and Kehoe (2005). The value
of the span-of-control parameters from these studies range from 0.8 to 0.9. A value of 0.8
for the agricultural sector appears compatible with these estimates.6 Over the same period,
return to land and hired labor are almost identical, which suggests α = 0.5 a consistent
value.
I restrict the skill type distribution to be lognormal with mean µ and standard deviation
σ. Given values of (β,A, γ, α), I choose the remaining six parameters (a¯, η, L¯, µ, σ, θ) simul-
taneously to match moments of the US economy in 1992. From the World Development
Indicator, agriculture employs 2% of the labor force. I also target a long run agricultural
employment share of 0.5%. This corresponds to the asymptotic agricultural employment
share when the subsistence consumption share of income is effectively zero. To discipline
θ, I turn to data on time allocations of farm operators. From 1992 census of agriculture, I
compute the distribution of labor hours over farmers in 5 different age groups: 25-34, 35-44,
45-54, 55-64, 65+. Within the model, this statistic corresponds to 1−si∑T
i=1 1−si
because farmers
of generation i spend (1 − si) fraction of their time producing. I choose θ to reproduce the
share of farmers aged 35-44. However, the implied shares of other farmers are reasonably
6Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2009) use a smaller value γ = 0.6, but they do not include hired labor in
their production function.
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close to the data.7 Finally, I ask the model to reproduce the observed size distribution of
farms in the US. Figure 4 plots the calibrated size distribution against data. In addition, as
depicted in Figure 5, the model also implies a land distribution that fits the data very well,
even though it is not targeted. These figures are presented in Appendix B.
3.2 Quantitative Results
In this section I assess the model’s ability to quantitatively explain cross-country variations
in agricultural productivity and scale of production. Data on sectoral productivity, sectoral
labor shares and land endowment are from Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008). The size distri-
butions of farms are constructed from the World Census of Agriculture (round 1990, 2000)
published by Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. These two data
sets, however, are not directly comparable because of time period differences. The data in
Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008) pertain to the year 1985. World Census of Agriculture is a
collection of national agriculture censuses administered independently in each member coun-
try - possibly in different years (see Table 10 for country specific census years). In principle,
this study should be restricted to countries with their censuses conducted in 1985. As a first
pass, however, I merge these two data sets with two defenses. First, census of agriculture
typically takes place every 5 years in most countries, if at all. It is thus rather costly to
obtain completely synchronized data set as detailed as the present one. Second, even though
census year in the sample ranges from 1980 to 2000. Most of the countries indeed have their
censuses conducted around 1990. It is unlikely that the composition of farms will undergo
drastic changes over a period of five years. The sample consists of 40 countries with good
representation of both developed and developing nations8.
Countries differ in their aggregate efficiency (A) and land endowment (L¯), and are oth-
erwise identical. In particular, they all face the same ex-ante distribution of skill types. I
infer Ai and L¯i of country i as follows
Ai =
ynlni
ynlnus
, L¯i =
LERi
LERus
· L¯us
where ynlni is the nonagricultural GDP per worker of country i, and LERi is the land-
7See Appendix B for details.
8Burkina Faso, Egypt, India, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Uganda, Dominica, Pakistan, Ivory Coast, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, Tunisia, Switzerland, Portugal, Ecuador, Peru, Netherland, Belgium, Spain, Colombia,
Nicaragua, Ireland, Austria, Germany, France, Denmark, Venezuela, United Kingdom, Finland, Brazil,
Chile, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, Canada, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, United States
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employment ratio of country i. Both are directly available from Restuccia et al. (2008).
To assess the quantitative performance of the model, I focus on the following metrics:
agricultural labor share (La), real agricultural output per worker (ryala), real GDP per
worker (rgdp) and mean farm size (mfs). Note that agricultural employment is the sum of
agricultural workers and farmers. When computing GDP, US price is used as international
price to make results comparable to the data, which is PPP adjusted. To facilitate compari-
son between model and data, I divide countries in the sample into quintile by real GDP per
worker in the data. Productivity in the richest quintile (Q.5) is normalized to be 1. The
results are summarized in Table 1.
Quintile rgdp ryala La mfs
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Q.1 0.13 0.19 0.04 0.04 0.66 0.48 7 16
Q.2 0.30 0.35 0.15 0.12 0.34 0.22 56 43
Q.3 0.52 0.59 0.36 0.37 0.18 0.07 83 107
Q.4 0.85 0.87 0.82 0.48 0.08 0.05 68 69
Q.5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.05 0.05 515 381
Table 1: Model vs Data, by Income Quintile
The model does an excellent job explaining productivity differences. In the sample, the
richest (Q.5) countries are about 8 times more productive overall and 25 times more pro-
ductivity in agriculture, relative to the poorest countries (Q.1). The model generates almost
the same magnitude of differences. Low agricultural productivity can arise from two sources:
low TFP and low average productivity of farmers. However, the former can account for at
most 50% of the differences in agricultural productivity between Q.5 and Q.1 country. The
reason is that Q.5 country is at most 5 times more productive in nonagricultural production,
compared to Q. 1 country. The differences in idiosyncratic productivity of farmers explain
the remaining half. These results suggest that the quality of farmers are at least as important
as overall efficiency for understanding productivity differences in agriculture.
Farms in rich nations are much larger compared to those in poor nations in the data,
and so are they in the model. Mean farm size is 381 hectares in the 80th percentile country,
and only 16 hectares in the 20th percentile country. Countries not only differ in their
average scale, but also in their size distribution. In Appendix B I plot the endogenously
generated farm size distributions along with their empirical counterparts for all countries in
the sample. Even though ex ante all countries face the same skill-type distribution, the ex
post size distribution of farms exhibits vast variations across levels of income. For a large set
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of countries the model can reproduce the actual distributions almost exactly, which I view
as a success of the model.
Agriculture, despite its low productivity, absorbs most of the labor force in poor nations.
The model is able to capture this stylized fact as well. For the bottom quintile countries,
the model predicts a 48% agricultural employment share - about 80% of the actual share.
The fact that the model fails to generate a larger agricultural labor share suggests other
forces at work that are not specifically modeled here. Among other things, barriers to
sectoral labor movements are particularly important to the question posted here. Moreover,
such barriers are prevalent in developing nations as evidenced by substantial disparities in
rural-urban earnings. One famous example is the Hukou system in China that imposes
institutional restrictions on immigration from rural villages to urban cities. Unfortunately,
direct measures of barrier to labor movement are not available, making further quantitative
analysis that incorporates these barriers infeasible.9
Agriculture’s share of total output declines as income rises - a macroeconomic implication
of Engel’s Law. The model predicts agricultural output to be 10% of the aggregate output
in the top quintile countries, and 70% in the bottom quintile countries. In the data, the
value is 3% and 30%, respectively. One possible explanation is that the model over-predicts
the relative price of agricultural output, resulting in a higher agriculture share of GDP
when measured at domestic prices. Using ICP data from the World Bank, I compute the
relative price between “agricultural consumption” and “nonagricultural consumption” for
all available countries.10 The relative price in 2005 is around 4 times higher in the 10th
percentile country, compared to the 90th percentile country. In the model, this relative price
ratio is 2.8, which is roughly in line with the data.
Consensus in the development literature attributes TFP differences as the main source
of income differences. The poorest countries in the sample have 4.5 times lower TFP and
2.1 times lower land endowment, relative to the US.11 If TFP of these countries is fixed
at the US level, and land endowment at its country-specific value, equilibrium allocations
change minimally. Poor endowment is the least to blame for low agricultural productivity.
9Some measures are constructed indirectly using first order conditions in Restuccia et al. (2008). A
straightforward incorporation of these barriers improves model’s prediction substantially. However, the fact
the farmers and farm workers are treated differently in my model complicates the mapping between my
model and the data. As a result, I do not pursue this route.
10“Agricultural consumption” is defined as food, non-alcoholic beverage, alcoholic beverage and tobacco.
“Nonagricultural consumption” is defined as the rest of individual consumptions plus capital consumption.
A similar calculation is done also in Lagakos and Waugh (2010)
11These countries are Burkina Faso, Uganda, India, Ivory Coast and Pakistan
14
In contrast, if TFP is fixed at its country-specific level, and land endowment at the US level,
there is a 22-fold reduction in agricultural productivity. Table 2 summarizes these results.
A reversed calculation implies that improvement in overall efficiency benefits agriculture
disproportionately, i.e., a 4.5-fold improvement in overall efficiency increases agricultural
productivity by a factor of 22. Public policies, albeit agriculture oriented, should aim at
improving overall efficiency through better institutes, better educations and more efficient
markets.
Exg. variable La ryala mfs
L¯ only 2.5% 1/2 117
A only 24% 1/22 47
Both A and L¯ 53% 1/48 13
Data 70% 1/51 3
Table 2: TFP versus Endowment
3.3 Discussion
An novel and key feature of the model is to embed skill accumulation in an otherwise standard
Lucas’ span-of-control model. A similar idea was explored in Bhattacharya (2009), who shows
that skill accumulation is critical to quantitatively explain cross-country variation in firm size
distribution and income. While in that paper the main channel of variation is coming from
resources input in skill accumulation, in this model the main mechanism operators through
nonhomothetic preferences. To highlight the quantitative importance of skill accumulation,
I calibrate a version of the model without skill accumulation, and then assess its quantitative
prediction for the representative poor country. The model without skill fails to generate the
observed size distribution of farms in the US. Moreover, given exogenous variables, the model
without skill accumulation in general explains less of the cross-section differences in labor
allocation and productivity. Details of calibration and quantitative results are presented in
Appendix B.
As shown in Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008), barriers to intermediate inputs have size-
able impact on labor allocation and agricultural productivity. Here I explore how such
barriers affect agricultural productivity in an environment with idiosyncratic farmers. To do
so, I modify the agricultural production technology to incorporate intermediate input, X .
Ya = A · z
1−γ
(
Xφ · hρ · ℓ1−φ−ρ
)γ
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Intermediate good can be converted from nonagricultural output at the rate of π. For
expositional purposes, I suppress skill accumulation. Detailed calibration and results are
given in Appendix B. As expected, the model explains more of the differences in labor
allocation and productivity when distortion in intermediate inputs are included (58% vs.
48% in labor share, 33-fold vs. 28-fold differences in agricultural productivity).
Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008) explore the impact of intermediate input on agricul-
tural productivity through the intensive margin. However, there are evidences suggesting
that the extensive margin might also be important. Evenson and Gollin (2003) document a
substantial lag in adoption of modern variety in Sub-Saharan Africa during the 1960s and
1970s. There are two ways skill might affect the use of modern inputs. Through the exten-
sive margin, low skill might impede the farmer’s learning of the new variety, and delays the
decision of adoption. Through intensive margin, low skill farmers might use modern variety
to a less extent if skill is complementary to modern varieties. Quantitative explorations from
these angles are left for future work.
4 Conclusion
Unmeasured skill of farmers is shown to be quantitatively important for understanding cross
country differences in agricultural productivity. Even though skill is latent in nature, the
model establishes a link between skill and farm size distribution, which is observable. The
model is able to capture not only the fact that mean farm size increases with the level of
income, it also generates endogenously size distributions that are reasonably close to the
data.
The agricultural sector characterized in this paper is “poor but efficient”, as articulated
in Schultz (1964). Nonetheless, various distortions geared specifically towards agriculture
are also important. Distortions such as barriers to sectoral labor movements, and implicit
government taxation on agriculture as discussed in Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes (1988) and
Anderson (2009), might be key to understand the coexistence of a large labor force and low
productivity in agriculture in poor nations. While eliminating these distortions is important
for development in agriculture, public policies favoring better institutions, faster technology
adoptions and more efficient markets are of first order importance in improving overall living
standards.
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A Data Appendix
• World Census of Agriculture: This data set is published by the Food and Agri-
culture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. The data set is an archive of
national agriculture censuses from a wide range of developing and developed countries.
FAO processes these national censuses and presents key summary statistics in a com-
mon, internationally comparable format. The unit of observation in WCA is a holding
- defined as “an economic unit of agricultural production under single management
comprising all livestock kept and all land used wholly or partly for agricultural pro-
duction purposes, without regard to title, legal form, or size”. Throughout this paper,
I view a holding as identical to a farm. http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-data/ess-wca
• World Development Indicator: Data can be accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
• Factor Shares in U.S Farming: Data are from National Agriculture Statistics Ser-
vices administrated by the Department of Agriculture, and can be accessed through
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FarmIncome/FinfidmuXls.htm . In the calculation, government trans-
fers are subtracted from total output and real estate and non real estate interest are
included as capital income.
1985 1980-1990 1990-1999 1980-1999
Intermediate 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.49
Capital 0.24 0.24 0.15 0.20
Labor 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06
Land 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04
Managers 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.20
Table 3: Factor Shares in U.S. Farming
• Working Days by Age of Farm Operator: From 1992 census of agriculture, I
extract the number of days off the farm for farm operators by age (Panel A), assuming
250 working days a year. Midpoint of the interval is used as the interval average.
• Scale and Productivity By Age of Farm Operator: The following table is re-
stricted to farm operators whose primary occupation is farming. Mean holding size
is measured by acreage per farm. Productivity is measured by net cash income of
operators.
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Panel A
25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Total
None 52,938 104,375 110,380 158,629 249,512 675,834
1-99 days 18,015 29,804 25,428 27,061 19,267 119,575
100-199 days 7,872 14,648 14,308 12,423 6,169 55,420
200 days + 10,028 15,565 14,681 11,082 5,087 56,443
Panel B
Work Days (1000s) 17875 33908 34478 46589 66975
% Days 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.34
Table 4: Days off Farm by Age of Operator
Age 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Mean Holding Size 575 857 909 736 542
Net Cash Income 59,839 90,705 91,501 60,249 32,282
Source: 2007 U.S. Census of Agriculture, Vol 1, Chapter 1: Table 63.
Table 5: Scale and Productivity over Life Cycle of Farm Operators
B Model Appendix
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2:
Profit function is linear in skill, i.e.,
π(z) =π˜ · z
where π˜ = (1− γ) · (P · A)
1
1−γ
(
γ
(α
w
)α(1− α
q
)1−α) γ1−γ
In a stationary equilibrium, the optimal sequence of skill investment is the solution to the
following problem
max
st
:
T∑
t=1
R1−t · zt · (1− st)
s.t : zt+1 = zt(1 + s
θ
t )
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Let λt be the Lagrangian multiplier for period t
L =
T∑
t=1
R1−t · zt · (1− st)− λt(zt+1 − zt(1 + s
θ
t ))
F.O.Cs are
R1−t = λtθs
θ−1
t (7)
λt = R
−t(1− st+1) + λt+1(1− δt + s
θ
t ) (8)
From equation (8), if λt+1 is independent of beginning of period skill zt, then (λt) does not
depend on zt. Consequently the equation (7) the optimal time investment st does not depend
on zt as well. To solve the optimal path, I use backward induction. Clearly, it is optimal to
invest no time in the last period, sT = 0, λT = 0, and hence independent of zT−1. Using the
argument above, λT−1 and sT−1 does not depend on zT−1. Repeating this argument implies
that the entire path of investment is independent of initial skill type.
Proof of Lemma 4:
Consider two economies with Ar = g · Ap, g > 1, and assume the threshold level of skill and
interest rate are the same in these two economies. Equation (3) implies qr = g · qp because
optimal time st depends only on interest rate. Given this, equation (4) implies pr = pp.
These two conditions, together with equation (5), further implies Yr = g · Yp, i.e., aggregate
income is proportional to aggregate TFP. Aggregate production of agricultural good is also
proportional to TFP. However, with nonhomothetic preferences, Equation (5) suggests that
demand of agricultural consumption drops by less than a factor of g. Excess demand pushes
up the price of agricultural consumption, and reduces the threshold level of skill in low
efficiency economy. This implies a higher labor share in agriculture, and a decline in the
supply of nonagricultural good. Interest rate must rise to offset the excess demand.
B.2 Development Accounting Exercise
To simply the calculation, I assume that all farms in size class [sl, sh] have the same size
(sl+ sh)/2. Let si denote the mean farm size, and µi denote the corresponding share in class
i. In addition, let yi and hi denote, respectively, the output and labor. Using U.S. data, I
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estimate the following equations
log ((y/h)i) = b1 + b2 · log(si)
log ((hl)i) = c1 + c2 · log(si)
Note that yi is measured by the total market sales of goods net of government payments, and
hi is measured by the sum of farm operators and hired workers. The methodology in U.S.
agriculture census assumes one farm operator per farm. Let ni note the number of farms
with hli denote the reported number of hired labor. The total number of worker in size class
i is simply ni + hli. For 2007, the estimated coefficients are (b1, b2) = (-0.916,0.548) and
the R2 is 93% for the first regression. For the second regression, the estimated coefficients
are (c1, c2) = (1.62, 0.058) and the R2 is 72%. Given size distribution µi over size class,
then aggregate output per worker is computed as
Y =
∑
i
[(b1 + b2 · log(si)) · hi · µi]
hi =
(c1 + c2 · log(si)) · µi + µi∑
i [(c1 + c2 · log(si)) · µi + µi]
where the second equation gives the distribution of workers over size classes.
B.3 Parameter Values
η a¯ θ L¯ µ σ
0.015 0.221 0.3157 0.7842 -3.1236 4.1693
Table 6: Parameter Values
Age 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Data 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.34
Model 0.08 0.17 0.20 0.26 0.29
Table 7: Time Share by Age of Operator: Model against Data
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Figure 4: Calibrated Size Distribution
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Figure 5: Implied Distribution of Land
24
B.4 Model Performances
1. Baseline Model Prediction
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Figure 6: Model Prediction Against Data
2. Model without Skill Accumulation
I calibrate (η, a¯, µ, σ) to match: current agricultural employment (2%), long run agri-
culture employment (0.5%), Mean farm size (198) and coefficient of variation of farm
size distribution (0.5). I ask the model to predict for a representative poor country
with 4.5 times lower TFP and a 2.1 times smaller land endowment.
Exg. variable La ryala mfs
L¯ only 3.3% 1/1.6 65
A only 22% 1/16 20
Both A and L¯ 48% 1/28 6
Data 70% 1/51 3
Table 8: TFP versus Endowment (No Skill Accumulation)
3. Model with Intermediate Inputs
I set γ = 0.8, φ = 0.5 and ρ = 0.2. For the U.S, π = 1. I choose (η, a¯, µ, σ) to target a
2% current agriculture employment, 0.5% long run agriculture employment, 2% share
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of agriculture output of GDP, and the mean farm size. Again I ask the calibrated
model to predict equilibrium allocations for the representative poor country, which has
4.5 times lower TFP, 2.1 times smaller land endowment and 3 times higher relative
price of intermediate inputs.
Exg. variable La ryala mfs
L¯ only 2.4% 1/1.2 88
A only 29% 1/17 18
π only 3.1% 1/1.6 135
A and L¯ 34% 1/20 7
A and π 49% 1/28 12
π and L¯ 3.6% 1/1.9 57
A, π and L¯ 58% 1/33 5
Data 70% 1/51 3
Table 9: TFP versus Endowment (With Intermediate)
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B.5 Model Predicted Farm Size Distribution
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B.6 Model Predicted Farm Size Distribution
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Size Distribution: Model vs Data
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Code rgdpwok MFS (Ha) No. Holding Area (Ha) Census Year
ARG 25715 468.97 378357 177437398 1988
AUS 46436 3,601.68 129540 466561000 1990
AUT 45822 26.42 273210 7217498 1990
BEL 50600 16.06 87180 1400364 1990
BFA 1824 2.79 886638 2472480 1993
BRA 18797 72.76 4859865 353611246 1996
CAN 45304 241.94 280043 67753700 1991
CHE 44152 11.65 108296 1262167 1990
CHL 23244 83.74 316492 26502363 1997
CIV 4966 3.89 1117667 4351663 2001
COL 12178 23.28 1547846 36033713 1988
DEU 42708 32.84 566900 18617900 1990
DNK 45147 34.14 81267 2774127 1989
DOM 12508 2.34 9026 21146 1995
ECU 12664 14.66 842882 12355831 1999
EGY 12670 0.95 3475502 3297281 1990
ESP 39033 18.79 2284944 42939208 1989
FIN 39611 61.88 199385 12338439 1990
FRA 45152 28.42 1006120 28595799 1988
GBR 40620 70.21 244205 17144777 1993
GRC 31329 4.50 802400 3609000 1995
HUN 21554 6.67 966916 6448000 1993
IND 9903 1.69 97155000 164562000 1985
IRL 47977 26.04 170578 4441755 1991
ITA 51060 7.51 3023344 22702356 1990
LKA 7699 0.81 1787370 1449342 2002
MAR 11987 5.84 1496349 8732223 1996
NIC 5697 31.34 199549 6254514 2001
NLD 45940 16.99 127367 2163472 1989
NOR 50275 9.97 99382 991077 1989
NZL 37566 223.43 70000 15640348 2000
PAK 6995 3.80 5071112 19252672 1990
PER 10240 20.15 1756141 35381809 1994
PRT 30086 6.74 594418 4005594 1989
SWE 40125 93.87 81410 7641890 1999
TUN 17753 11.58 471000 5455300 1994
UGA 1763 2.16 1704721 3683288 1991
URY 20772 288.31 54816 15803763 1990
USA 57259 186.95 2087759 390311617 1987
VEN 19905 60.02 500979 30071192 1997
Table 10: Summary Statistics of World Census of Agriculture
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